In this paper we show how Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics has to be modified in order to cope with paradoxical phenomena. It will turn out that one of its basic tenets has to be given up, namely the definition of the correctness of an inference as validity preservation. As a result, the notions of an argument being valid and of an argument being constituted by correct inference rules will no more coincide. The gap between the two notions is accounted for by introducing the distinction between sense and denotation in the proof-theoretic-semantic setting.
A paradoxical connective λ equivalent to its negation is characterized by the following rules and reduction:
The labels introduction and elimination may appear odd at first, since the logical constant figures both in the premise and in the conclusion of the rule. The labels are however justified, as λ is the main operator of the conclusion of the introduction rule and the main operator of the premise of the elimination rule.
By means of the rules for λ (together with those for negation) one can very easily produce a closed derivation, we call it , of ¬λ:
By applying λ-intro to , one also obtains a closed derivation of λ itself: ( ) So, we have two derivations and of λ and ¬λ respectively.
By combining the two by means of ¬-elim, we obtain a closed derivation of ⊥:
( ) Contrary to and , is not normal since the major premise of the last application of ¬-elim is obtained by ¬-intro. By applying the reduction procedure of negation (¬-Red) to , we obtain the following derivation:
Also this derivation is not normal as the major premise of the last application of ¬-elim is the conclusion of two consecutive applications of λ-intro and λ-elim.
But as soon as we apply the reduction procedure for λ (λ-Red) to this derivation, we obtain again . That is, the process of reduction enters what Tennant [33] called an 'oscillating loop'. This situation confirms the paradoxical nature of λ: We can produce closed derivations of both λ and its negation. This obviously leads to contradiction, i.e. to a closed derivation of ⊥.
Furthermore, the proof-theoretic setting highlights that there is something strange in this derivation, namely that it cannot be normalized. Prawitz [16] and in a more systematic way Tennant [33] proposed to take this feature as the proof-theoretic characterization of paradoxes, namely that they give rise to closed derivations of ⊥ whose normalization process enters an oscillating loop.
This, to which I will refer to as a simplified presentation of paradoxes, should be supplemented by the following remarks:
The first thing to observe is that, being a nullary connective, λ behaves like a sentence which is interderivable with its own negation.
As is well known, if the deductive language considered is expressive enough, it can be proved that a sentence like λ can be explicitly defined. Examples of languages which are expressive enough are those which allow to refer to their own syntax-as arithmetic does by means of Gödel numbering, or natural language does by means of quotes-and that contain a transparent truth predicate-that is a predicate T governed by the following inference rules:
where A is a name of the sentence A. Another example of a language which is expressive enough is a language equipped with an unrestricted comprehension principle [for a natural deduction formulation, see e.g. 16 , Appendix B]. 1 The stipulation that λ is governed by the two rules and by the reduction above may appear too brute. However it has the advantage of permitting to disregard the exact conditions at which a sentence like it can be defined, and to focus on what is essential for the analysis of paradoxes to be developed in this article.
It should be kept in mind that the analysis to be developed does not apply only to this simplified version of paradoxes. On the contrary, it can straightforwardly be applied also to paradoxes defined by the usual and more subtler means. The work of Tennant [33] is in this sense exemplary. He considers a rather rich variety of both semantics and set-theoretic paradoxes-the Liar and some of its relatives, Russell's, Grelling's and Tarski's quotational paradox-and shows that once the assumptions required for their formulation are spelled out in terms of natural deduction rules, they all generate derivations of ⊥ (or, as in the case of Curry's paradox, of an arbitrary atomic proposition) which do not normalize.
Remark 1.2
The nullary connective ⊥ counts as a contradiction only if some sort of explosion principle is associated to it. This is the case in intuitionistic logic, where the ex falso rule ⊥ A ensures that ⊥ is indeed something 'bad'. An explosion principle is available also in classical logic. However, all paradoxes investigated by Tennant yield a non-normalizing derivation of ⊥ using only intuitionistic acceptable inference rules (beyond those specific for the paradox). Therefore he concludes his analysis stressing that 'it appears to me an open question whether every paradoxical set of sentences […] can be shown to be paradoxical by means of an intuitionistic proof with a looping reduction sequence'.
Rogerson [25] shows that in classical logic, Curry's paradox generates a derivation for an arbitrary atom which does normalize. Rogerson takes this as a counterexample to Tennant's claim. I'd rather take this as a reason to strengthen Tennant's point to the claim that it is only in the context of intuitionistic logic that paradoxes yield derivations of an unacceptable conclusion with a looping reduction sequence. For this and other reasons to be spelled out below, the intuitionistic stance will be adopted throughout the paper.
Nonetheless, Tennant is forced to relax his initial formulation in order to account for Yablo's [37] paradox. In order for this paradox to fit his criterion, Tennant has to take as distinctive trait of paradoxical arguments not only their having 'looping reduction sequence[s]', but more in general 'non-terminating reduction sequence[s]' [34, p. 200n] . However, for the present scopes, I will stick to Tennant's original formulation.
Remark 1.3
Different simplified versions of paradoxes such as the one given above have been discussed on the background of certain extensions of both natural deduction and sequent calculus. Schroeder-Heister [31] , developing ideas of Hallnäs [13] , considers extensions of both sequent calculi and natural deduction by means of clausal definitions. In this context, paradoxes are typical examples of nonwell-founded definitions such as the following one, in which an atom R (only a notational variant of the λ used in this article) is defined through its own negation:
Definitions are 'put in action' by inference rules, which are justified by a principle of definitional closure (yielding introduction rules in natural deduction and right rules in sequent calculus) and a principle of definitional reflection (yielding elimination rules and left rules respectively). The natural deduction rules putting definition D in action are just the rules for λ.
A different but related approach is Dowek's deduction modulo [1] , where a given set of rewriting rules (essentially corresponding to a definition in the sense of Schoreder-Heister) is viewed as inducing a congruence relations on propositions, modulo which deductive reasoning takes place.
The difference between the two approaches is exploited in their typed versions as follows: in definitional reflection a type-constructor-yielding a term typed by the definiens (the head of the clause) when applied to terms typed by the definiendum (the body of the clause)-is associated to each clause of the definition together with an inverse operation of type annihilation for the given defined atom. On the other hand, in deduction modulo the types of the definiens and of the definiendum are just identified modulo the congruence induced by the set of rewriting rules. In this case there are thus no explicit operations on terms corresponding to the definitional steps.
In both settings the proof-terms which are associated with the above derivation of ⊥ do not normalize. In deduction modulo, this term is just the same as the non-normalizing term (wellknown from untyped lambda calculus). In the definitional setting the term has a somewhat richer structure induced by the presence of the extra type-constructors associated to the definitional steps.
The analysis of paradoxes to be developed in the article is by no means in contrast to the one arising from these settings and it should be applicable in these more general settings as well. This is a task which will be left for further work.
Of great interest is also to compare the analysis here developed with the one proposed by Ripley [24] in the sequent calculus setting, in which ideas coming from Girard [9 and 10, ch. 3] are applied to a language equipped with a transparent truth predicate.
Remark 1.4
Given the correspondence between normalizability and cut-elimination, and given that cutelimination expresses the transitivity of deduction, the approach developed in the article can be viewed as giving an analysis of paradoxes focusing on the role of transitivity.
It should however be stressed that all considerations made so far, as well as those to be made below, assume the unrestricted validity of contraction.
In the natural deduction system here considered, contraction corresponds to the possibility of discharging more than one copy of an assumption at once. The ¬-intro rule can of course be modified by allowing at most one copy of an assumption to be discharged at a time. This would amount to drop contraction. In the modified system, the non-normalizing derivation is blocked, since it is impossible to derive ⊥ using the rules of λ and the 'restricted' negation rules. Actually it would not even be possible to derive either of λ or ¬λ. Therefore all derivations would normalize, i.e. transitivity would be fully restored.
That contraction is an essential ingredient for triggering Russell's paradox has already been observed by Fitch [6] who initiated the investigations of contraction-free logical settings. Formal attempts at developing naive set theory (i.e. a set theory based on a full comprehension schema) in a contraction-free setting are due to Grišin [12] and more recently to Girard [11] and Petersen [15] . A very recent and promising attempt at developing a theory of truth (and thus of addressing also semantic paradoxes) on contraction-free bases is that of Zardini [38] .
Although approaches to paradoxes based on contraction are of great interest, they will not be pursued in the article. As it will be clear from the analysis developed below, there is no need of trying to restore normalizability by e.g. renouncing to contraction. In particular, a genuine philosophical content will be given to the fact that paradoxical derivations of ⊥ does not normalize.
Proof-theoretic semantics
According to Schroeder-Heister [28] , the core of Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics is a definition of the predicate 'valid'. Unlike 'true', which applies to sentences, 'valid' applies to more complex linguistic structures: arguments.
Proofs as denotations of arguments
Semantic theories are alternatively presented either as a definition of a semantic predicate or as consisting in a mapping from linguistic entities onto semantic values. When 'true' is the central semantic predicate, the semantics can be seen as mapping true sentences on the truth-value 'Truth' (in Fregean terms) or on facts (in a more, say, Russellian or Wittgensteinian fashion). Accordingly, I assume that also Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics should be presented in this way: the syntactic expressions in questions are arguments and the semantic values are proofs, i.e. I will say that valid arguments denote, or represent, proofs.
I take proofs to be, in intuitionistic terms, mental constructions, informally characterized by the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) clauses [see, for instance, 36, ch. 1, sec. 3.1]. Whereas facts are usually characterized as recognition-transcendent entities, proofs are here understood as always recognizable (at least in principle). Proof-theoretic semantics thus takes as its semantic values entities of an epistemic nature and for this reason it is a form of semantic anti-realism.
Arguments are linguistic entities defined by rules in natural deduction format.
While in the formal setting of intuitionistic natural deduction I spoke of derivations, I will now follow Dummett [3] in using the term 'argument', in order to stress the fact that the semantics is not necessarily tight to a specific formal system. Furthermore, by an argument I will understand one which categorically establishes its conclusion and therefore the term 'argument' does not cover what are sometimes called hypothetical argument, i.e. those pieces of reasoning in which the conclusion depends on some assumptions. Thus, (categorical) arguments correspond in a natural deduction setting to so-called closed derivations, i.e. those in which all assumptions are discharged by the application of some rule.
I will assume that the same proof may be represented by different valid arguments.
In particular, valid canonical arguments-i.e. arguments ending with an introduction rule-directly represent proofs, in the sense that the structure of the argument corresponds to the structure of the denoted proof (or, better, to the structure of the process of construction of which the proof is the result).
For example, the BHK clause for conjunction states that a proof of a conjunction is a couple constituted by two proofs, one for each conjunct; analogously, a valid canonical argument for a conjunction is obtained by joining together by means of the introduction rule for conjunction two valid arguments for the two conjuncts.
On the other hand, valid non-canonical arguments represent proofs only indirectly, in the sense that their structure does not correspond to the structure of the proof they denote. Nonetheless, if an argument is valid, then it should be possible to rearrange it so that its structure directly corresponds to the one of the denoted proof. For Dummett this amounts to the 'fundamental assumption' that 'if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator' [3, p. 254] .
The process of rearranging the structure of non-canonical arguments stems from the normalization results [16] for Gentzen's [8] natural deduction systems. For each standard connective reduction procedures are defined and it can be shown that the subsequent application of the reduction procedures to a given derivation D ends in a derivation D to which no reduction procedure can be further applied, a normal derivation.
Reduction procedures are 'rewriting' operations on arguments. More precisely, taken a nonintroductory inference rule, a reduction procedure associated to the rule specifies the following: how to replace an argument D obtained by substituting canonical arguments for the premises of the rule, with an argument D having the same conclusion and (at most) the same open assumptions of D which does not make use of the inference rule at stake. For example, ¬-Red is the reduction procedure associated to ¬-elim. For the (non-standard) connective λ, λ-Red is the reduction procedure associated with λ-elim.
The corollary of normalization which is most relevant for the development of a semantics on prooftheoretic basis is that every closed normal derivation in the natural deduction system for intuitionistic logic ends with an introduction rule for the principal operator of its conclusion. This, together with the fact that every derivation normalizes, is the ground for Dummett's Fundamental Assumption.
Although arguments and proofs are entities of different sorts (i.e. linguistic entities and, say, denotations), a normal canonical argument denotes a proof in the most direct way possible. For this reason, Dummett and Prawitz tend to identify such arguments with the proofs they denote. 2 As this allows to better appreciate the central role of reduction procedures in the proof-theoretic semantic picture, I will here adopt their view.
To reduce an argument is to transform it in canonical form. But given the identification of canonical arguments with proofs themselves, and given that proofs are the denotations of valid arguments, the process of reducing an argument to canonical form can be viewed as the process of assigning to the argument its denotation, i.e. of interpreting it.
In general we can say the following: As canonical arguments are-or, more properly, represent in the most direct way-their own denotation, for them interpretation is just identity. In the case of arbitrary arguments, to interpret them is to reduce them to canonical form.
Hence, typically, a valid non-canonical argument D and the valid canonical argument D to which D reduces denote the very same proof.
This way of looking at things is suggested also by the Curry-Howard isomorphism between derivations in the implicational fragment of intuitionistic natural deduction and terms of the simply typed lambda calculus. Consider two natural deduction derivations such that one reduces to the other. They correspond to two terms, one of which β-reduces to the other. β-reduction is usually viewed as yielding an equational theory on lambda terms. According to Frege, the content of an identity statement is that the two terms related by the identity sign denote the same object. Thus, the two arguments which correspond modulo Curry-Howard to equivalent terms denote the same (mental) object: a proof.
Validity of arguments and correctness of rules
Prawitz and Dummett made these ideas precise in the form of a definition of validity [see 3, 17, 21] . The essential idea of the definition is the following: For proofs there is no issue of validity (a non-valid proof is no proof at all); hence normal canonical arguments are valid by definition. On the other hand, the validity of an arbitrary argument consists in the possibility of reducing it to a normal argument in canonical form. An argument is thus valid with respect to a set of reduction procedures, since it is only in presence of reduction procedures that the notion of 'normal' acquires a specific content. (For Prawitz, validity is also relative to a set of canonical arguments for atomic sentences, although this aspect is irrelevant for our scopes). Thus: Definition 2.1 (Prawitz-style validity of an argument) An argument D is valid (with respect to a set J of reduction procedures and relative to a set S of canonical arguments for atomic sentences) iff:
• D is normal and canonical; • or D reduces to a normal canonical argument.
As in standard semantics the notion of truth is used to define logical consequence, in DummettPrawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics the notion of validity is used to define what may be called [following 29] the correctness of an inference. As for Tarski logical consequence is truth preservation, Prawitz [20] proposes to define the correctness of an inference as preservation of validity: 'An inference rule may be said to be valid when each application of it preserves validity of arguments'. (p. 165).
Although a perfect analogy with truth-conditional semantics is achieved, the relationship between validity of arguments and correctness of inferences appears odd. One would naturally define the validity of an argument in terms of the correctness of the inferences out of which it is constituted. In Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics it is rather the other way around. The validity of an argument is independently defined in terms of its being reducible to canonical form. And the correctness of an inference is defined, we could say, in terms of the validity of the arguments in which it is applied.
Prawitz himself acknowledges that this way of defining the validity of arguments and the correctness of inferences is not the most intuitive. Nonetheless, he stresses that the following intuitive principle still holds, although it is rejected as a definition of validity: In the case of introduction rules, their correctness is 'automatic' (in Dummett's [3] terminology, they are 'self-justifying'). Consider the rule of conjunction introduction (∧-intro):
The rule is correct iff it yields a valid argument for its conclusion whenever applied to valid arguments for its premises. Suppose we are given two valid arguments for A and B, respectively. Since they are valid, they reduce to two normal canonical arguments D 1 and D 2 . But notice that also the argument is normal and canonical, that is valid. Thus, whenever we apply ∧-intro to valid arguments we obtain an argument which is also valid (and this holds for any J and any S). Hence, ∧-intro is correct.
Whereas the correctness of introduction rules is automatic, to show the correctness of an elimination rule we need to make explicit reference to reduction procedures. Consider the left rule of conjunction elimination (∧-elim 1 ):
Again, its correctness amounts to its yielding a valid argument for its conclusion whenever applied to a valid argument for its premise. Suppose we have a valid argument for A∧B. Since it is valid, it reduces to a normal canonical argument. By applying ∧-elim 1 to it, one gets an argument-call it D -which is neither normal nor canonical. But the reduction procedure for conjunction (∧-Red 1 ) tells us that D reduces to the argument D 1 . And since we assumed the argument for A∧B to be valid, the argument D 1 for A must be valid as well. Thus, there is a reduction procedure j-namely ∧-Red 1 -such that whenever we apply ∧-elim 1 to arguments which are valid with respect to any J and relative to any S we obtain an argument which is valid with respect to J ∪{j} and relative to S. Hence, the rule ∧-elim 1 is correct.
In the light of this, Prawitz's explanation of why principle ( * ) holds should be clear enough:
'If all the inferences of an argument are applications of valid inference rules […], then it is easily seen that also the argument must be valid, namely with respect to the justifying operations [viz. the reduction procedures] in virtue of which the rules are valid. But this is not the way we have defined validity of arguments. On the contrary, the validity of an inference rule is explained in terms of validity of arguments (although once explained in this way, an argument may be shown to be valid by showing that all the inference rules applied in the argument are valid).' [20, p. 169] Unfortunately, the availability of reduction procedures is sufficient to show the correctness of an elimination rule only in what we may call 'standard' cases. Without undertaking the task of making the notion of 'standard' fully precise, it will be clear that whenever we have to deal with paradoxical phenomena we are not in a standard case.
As a result the availability of reduction procedures will be no more sufficient for a rule to be correct in Prawitz's sense. I will take this as showing that the definition of the correctness of an inference in terms of the validity of arguments must be relaxed. In order to defend this weaker notion of correctness of an inference, I will advocate its significance for enriching the proof-theoretic semantic picture.
Before turning to the analysis of paradoxes, we conclude this section with the following remarks:
The application of a reduction procedure 'cuts away' two consecutive applications of an introduction rule and of an elimination rule. Plausibly, a necessary condition for 'standardness' (i.e. for the availability of reduction procedures to be sufficient for the correctness of the rule in Prawitz's sense) is that all reduction procedures under consideration have the following property: The formulas which are conclusion of the application of the introduction and the major premise of the application of the elimination rule cut away by the application of the reduction procedures must be of a higher logical complexity than the formulas surrounding it. Clearly, λ-Red violates such a condition.
In sequent calculus, this condition is essentially that reductions for a principal cut on a formula A (or, in one-sided systems, on two formulas A and A ⊥ having the same complexity) yield one or more cuts on formulas B of strictly lower complexity than A (and A ⊥ ).
Finally, in the light of Remark 1.4 above, it is clear that this condition is plausible only in presence of contraction. In its absence, it is unnecessary restrictive.
Remark 2.4
Definition 2.1 is a simplification of Prawitz and Dummett's definition of validity, since it disregards certain complications arising from the possibility of discharging assumptions. As observed, Dummett and Prawitz speak of arguments rather than of derivations since they believe that proof-theoretic semantics should not be limited to a specific formal system, but also embrace a more general setting, in which arbitrary inference rules are allowed. These are rules such as, e.g. which may even encode intuitively unacceptable principles of reasoning, as in the case of R 2 . When such rules are admitted, Definition 2.1 turns out to be too permissive, as one can immediately realize by considering the following (intuitively unacceptable) argument:
Being normal and canonical, the argument would be counted as valid according to definition 2.1. To rule out cases such as this one, Prawitz and Dummett need a condition for the validity of a closed canonical argument stricter than just being normal. To achieve it, they first observe that the premise of the implication introduction rule is not just a formula, but a hypothetical argument having the consequent of the implication as conclusion and the antecedent as assumption. Hence they propose a simultaneous definition of the validity of (categorical) arguments and of hypothetical arguments.
After having provided an account of paradoxes, I will discuss the rules for Prior's tonk. In Section 3.4 its elimination rule will be shown to pose the same problem of rule R 2 . In the light of the proposed analysis of paradoxes, it will be clear that the problem just discussed is caused by Dummett and Prawitz will to define the correctness of an inference in terms of the validity of arguments. By defining the correctness of an inference independently of the validity of arguments, an alternative way of modifying definition 2.1 will be considered. Definition 2.2 is also a simplification of the one proposed by Dummett and Prawitz, in that it applies only to the inference rules of the simplest form, i.e. those which do not discharge any assumption.
Remark 2.5
Both definitions hinge on a general characterization of what a reduction procedure is.
For elimination rules, by means of an 'inversion principle' [14] one 'harmonious' elimination rule-i.e. an elimination rule equipped with appropriate reduction procedures-can be obtained from a given set of introduction rules. (See [26, 27] for an improvement over Prawitz's original formulation [19] .)
For arbitrary rules such as R 1 and R 2 the situation looks worse, as no method is known to decide whether an arbitrary inference rule can be equipped with an appropriate reduction [for a discussion of this problem, see 3, 18, 28] . For the present purposes, I will only make reference to indisputably acceptable reduction procedures or (as in section 3.3) to a case in which indisputably no reduction can be available on any reasonable account of the notion of reduction procedure.
Proof-theoretic semantics and paradoxes
How can this machinery be used to explain the phenomenon of paradoxes? Let's recall the basic features of paradoxes. By means of the rules for λ and ¬ we were able to produce two closed derivations (that is, two arguments) and of ¬λ and λ, respectively: By combining the two by means of ¬-elim, we obtained a closed derivation (an argument) of ⊥:
Not only and are normal. They are also canonical: is an argument for ¬λ ending with ¬-intro; and is an argument for λ ending with λ-intro. Thus, according to definition 2.1 they are valid.
On the contrary, is neither normal nor canonical. Furthermore, as 's reduction enters an oscillating loop, it does not even reduce to canonical form. Thus, according to definition 2.1 it is not valid. This is certainly good news. Valid arguments denote proofs. Thus, since is not valid, we are not committed to say that there is a proof of ⊥. This accords not only with the BHK explanation of the meaning of logical constants ('⊥ (contradiction) has no proof' [36 p. 9] ), but also with common sense! Nonetheless, poses a major threat to Prawitz's definition of correctness.
Revising correctness
If we look again at , we can observe that it is obtained by applying ¬-elim to two valid arguments. But since is not valid, we have that by applying ¬-elim to two valid arguments we obtain an invalid argument. Thus this is a case in which ¬-elim does not preserve validity. 4 Hence, if we accept Prawitz's Definition 2.2-according to which an inference is correct iff it yields valid arguments when applied to valid arguments-we are forced to say that ¬-elim is not correct.
But this conclusion is too hard to swallow. It is not ¬-elim to be blamed for not preserving validity. The source of the problem should rather be identified with the presence of λ. How can this intuition be spelled out?
As remarked in Section 2.2, the availability of reduction procedures usually suffices to warrant the correctness of the elimination rule to which they are associated. It should now be clear that, when the language contains paradoxical connectives such as λ, this is no more the case. To repeat, while in standard cases the existence of reduction procedures associated to the rule is enough to show that the rule preserves validity, this is not so in general.
A possible diagnosis of the situation is that Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics is too much tight to the standard cases. And for this reason, in non-standard situations it gives the odd result that an intuitively acceptable rule, such as ¬-elim, is not correct according to Definition 2.2.
Away out of the problem is just to deny that preservation of validity is the right way of characterizing the correctness of rules. Although in standard cases correct rules do transmit validity, it is way too demanding to expect a correct rule to preserve validity in all cases.
That the availability of reduction procedures for an inference rule suffices to warrant validity preservation tells us something important about the standard cases. However, from the fact that in general this does not happen, it should not follow that the availability of reduction procedures for an inference is not sufficient for the rule to be correct. Rather, it should only signal that we are not in a standard case.
Hence, I propose to weaken the notion of correctness, by directly taking the availability of reduction procedures associated to elimination rules as a sufficient condition for their correctness.
By making this idea precise, we end up with an alternative definition of the correctness of an inference:
Definition 3.1 (Correctness of an inference) An inference rule is correct iff
• It is an introduction; • or it is an elimination rule for †, and for each introduction rule for † there is a reduction procedure for consecutive applications of †-intro and †-elim rules in which † is the conclusion of †-intro and the major premise of †-elim.
The adoption of Definition 3.1 instead of Prawitz's Definition 2.2 results in a better analysis of the situation. Although is not valid (since it does not reduce to canonical form), ¬-elim is still correct since there is a reduction procedure associated with it.
It is true that ¬-elim does not preserve validity in all cases. But this is due to the presence of the paradoxical λ (indeed, in standard cases ¬-elim does preserve validity).
It may be retorted that the adoption of Definition 3.1 has the drawback of forcing the rejection of principle ( * ), according to which an argument is valid if it is constituted by correct rules. All rules in are correct according to Definition 3.1 but the argument as a whole is not. As we saw, although Prawitz rejected ( * ) as a definition of validity, he stressed that the principle still holds under his definitions of validity and correctness. And indeed it does hold even when paradoxes are around ( is invalid and it contains an inference, ¬-elim, which according to Prawitz's definition 2.2 is not correct). On the contrary, by replacing Prawitz's definition 2.2 with definition 3.1 we are forced to give up principle ( * ).
Is this really an unwanted consequence? I do not think so.
The new definition of the correctness of an inference makes the two notions of 'being valid' and 'being constituted by applications of correct inference rules' diverge. As we saw, the semantic content of an argument being valid is its having a denotation. In the following, I will argue that, when 'correct' is understood according to Definition 3.1, the notion of 'being constituted by applications of correct inference rules' has also a genuine semantic content which, furthermore, should be kept distinct from that of having a denotation: Namely, having sense.
Sense and denotation in proof-theoretic semantics
As observed, since cannot be reduced to canonical form, it fails to be valid according to Prawitz's definition 2.1.
The idea underlying the definition of validity is that proofs are denoted by valid arguments. Given that normal canonical arguments are the most direct way of representing proofs, I followed Dummett and Prawitz in identifying proofs with normal canonical arguments and thus, I proposed to view reduction to canonical form as the process of interpreting arguments, i.e. as the process of ascribing them their denotation.
As does not reduce to canonical form, it does not denote a proof, i.e. it lacks a denotation. In order to spell out the semantic content of the notion of 'being constituted by applications of correct inference rules', I would like to dwell some more on the idea that lacks a denotation. To properly do this, I borrow a few ideas from the debate about the interpretation of Frege's views on non-denoting expressions.
One of the more discussed issues of Frege's philosophy is whether non-denoting expressions do possess a sense, although they lack a denotation.
Very briefly, I would like to recall two possible interpretations of the relationship of sense to denotation, which bear heavy consequences for the treatment of expressions lacking a denotation.
Evans [5] proposed to conceive the sense of an expression as a way of thinking its denotation. Thus, in the case of a non-denoting expression, there is no denotation to be thought, and hence also no way of thinking it. No denotation implies no sense. If an expression lacks a denotation, we cannot use it to utter anything meaningful.
On the other hand, Dummett [2] interpreted the sense of an expression as a procedure to determine its denotation, that is a set of instructions describing how to individuate the denotation of the expression. Without entering the details of the idea, it should be clear enough that in general, it may be the case that although one is in possession of a set of instructions to identify something, any attempt to carry out the instructions fails. We may refer to such a situation as one in which the set of instructions is inapplicable. The inapplicability may depend on there not being a something satisfying the conditions codified in the set of instructions. Or on factual contingencies (such as time and space limitations). But one may also conceive cases of, say, structural inapplicability of the instructions. That is, cases in which the instructions are shaped in such a way that one cannot successfully bring to the end the procedure they codify.
In the presentation of proof-theoretic semantics I gave, the process of reduction is the process of ascribing to an argument its denotation. Dummett's model of sense perfectly applies to this situation: the set of instructions telling how an argument is to be reduced to canonical form is the set of instructions telling how to identify the denotation of the argument, i.e. it is the sense of the argument.
Consider again two arguments, such that one of them is a normal canonical one and the other is not but reduces to the former. As observed above, according to Dummett and Prawitz's prooftheoretic semantic picture the two arguments denote the same proof, just like two singular terms in a true identity statement denote the same object. Furthermore, as the two terms in general may have a different sense (as in Frege's celebrated morning star-evening star example), the two arguments denote the proof in two different ways. One in a direct manner, the other in an indirect manner. What I am now suggesting is to express this fact in a more traditional terminology, by saying that the arguments have different senses.
What may appear new with respect to Frege's way of framing the distinction between sense and denotation is the fact that different expressions refer to their denotation in more or less direct ways. This however is very much the same of what happens with numerical expressions in the language of Peano arithmetic. In Fregean terms, one could say that the identity statement '(SS0+S0)×S0 = SSS0' is true because the two numerical terms '(SS0+S0)×S0' and 'SSS0' denote the same number. However they do denote the same number in two very different manner. We can say that 'SSS0' is the most direct, or canonical, way of referring to the number three. On the other hand, to determine which is the number denoted by '(SS0+S0)×S0'we have to perform a certain number of operations. The two numerical terms express different ways in which the number three can be given, i.e. they have different senses.
Back to , as there is a reduction procedure associated to each of its non-introductory steps, we can say that also in this case there is a procedure to determine its denotation. Thus, there is a sense associated to the argument. However, although each step of the procedure in which the sense of consists can be carried out, it is not possible to bring the procedure to the end, due to its entering the oscillating loop. That is, the argument lacks a denotation.
To push the analogy with numerical terms further, one could say that is similar in behaviour to a complex numerical term obtained by means of a description operator, such as 'The (natural) number greater than two and smaller than three'. The sense of this term also consists in a procedure to determine its denotation (Take all natural number smaller than three and check whether there is one and only one which is also greater than two). Although the procedure can be applied, it fails to determine a number as the denotation of the numerical expression.
So, the alternative to Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics resulting from replacing Definition 2.2 with Definition 3.1 can be viewed as obtained by introducing alongside the idea that arguments have a denotation (proofs or canonical arguments), the idea that they also have a sense, where having sense means that they are constituted by applications of inference rules which are correct according to Definition 3.1.
Taking 'having sense' as the semantic content of 'being constituted of applications of correct inferences rules' and 'having a denotation' as the semantic content of 'being valid', we have an independent ground for the failure of principle ( * ): namely the existence of arguments endowed with sense which lack a denotation.
The alternative to Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics resulting from the adoption of Definition 3.1 returns an enlightening picture of paradoxes. The paradoxical arguments are not non-sense. On the contrary, what is paradoxical in them is exactly that they make perfectly sense. But putting this sense in action reveals their awkward features.
For an argument to be paradoxical, it must have sense. Its being paradoxical means that it does not denote a proof of its conclusion.
λ vs tonk
To really appreciate that the proposed distinction between sense and denotation is not an ad hoc solution to the problem of paradoxes, I believe it is worth comparing with a further kind of arguments for ⊥.
Let us consider Prior's tonk:
By means of tonk's rules, one can easily produce an argument for ⊥. Given an argument for any logically valid sentence, such as A ⊃ A, we extend it by tonk-intro to an argument for (A ⊃ A) tonk ⊥ and then by tonk-elim one obtains an argument for ⊥:
( ) The common features of and are the following:
• they both have ⊥ as conclusion;
• they are both non-canonical, since they end with an elimination rule; • they are both irreducible to canonical form.
Nonetheless, there is a crucial difference between and . On the one hand, cannot be reduced to canonical form because it is not normal and if one tries to apply the reduction procedures associated with its elimination rules one enters an oscillating loop. On the other hand, does not reduce to canonical form because no reduction is (nor can be) associated with tonk's rules, that is, because it is already a normal argument.
Although it may appear at first puzzling, is normal, since there is no reduction procedure that can be applied to it. This of course does not depend on the set of reduction procedures one is considering because, under any plausible notion of reduction procedures, there cannot be a reduction procedure associated to patterns constituted by an application of tonk-intro followed immediately by an application of tonk-elim.
As observed, two are the features of the normalization results for the natural deduction system for intuitionistic logic that suggested the development of a semantics of proof-theoretic basis. The first one is that every derivation normalizes; the second is that normal derivations end with an introduction rule. Thus, the additions of λ and tonk to a well-behaving system (such as the one for intuitionistic logic) pose two different kinds of problems. On the one hand, the addition of λ yields a failure of normalization, but does not threat the 'canonicity' of normal forms: Although not every argument normalizes (as exemplified by ), closed normal derivations always end with an introduction rule. On the other hand, in spite of the addition of tonk normalization still holds ( is normal since there is no reduction which can be applied to it); but the normality of ruins the semantic significance of normal forms, since it is no more the case that every closed normal derivation ends with an introduction. 5 With the semantic apparatus developed, we can express this as follows. As is normal but not canonical, it fails to be valid according to Definition 2.1, and hence, just like , it lacks a denotation.
Furthermore, there is no reduction procedure associated with tonk's elimination rule. Thus, the rule is not correct according to Definition 3.1. As a result, and contrary to , is not constituted by applications of correct inference rules. That is, not only lacks a denotation, but also a procedure to determine it, since we do not have any reduction procedure telling us how to transform it in canonical form. In other words, not only lacks a denotation but also sense.
An argument such as thus fails to count as paradoxical. It is just nonsensical.
Revising validity
In the alternative proof-theoretic picture proposed, 'to be valid' means 'to have a denotation' and 'to be constituted by correct rules' means 'to have sense'. Thus, as an expression must be endowed with sense in order to have a denotation, it may be natural to expect that a valid argument must also be constituted by correct rules. However, Definition 2.1 provides a criterion for the validity of an argument which is too weak to imply that the argument is constituted by correct rules. Consider the following argument:
Being normal and canonical, this argument would count as valid according to Definition 2.1, although it is constituted by an application of tonk-elim, an invalid inference rule.
As observed in Remark 2.4, Prawitz and Dummett's definition of validity can cope with cases such as this at the price of defining by simultaneous induction the validity of categorical and hypothetical arguments.
However, the above analysis suggests an alternative possibility. Since the correctness of an inference is now defined independently of the validity of arguments, a natural solution is that of explicitly requiring, for an argument to be valid, that all the rules out of which it is constituted are correct. That is, definition 2.1 is modified to the following: 
Conclusions
The notion of validity of arguments was introduced by Prawitz as a theoretical explicans of the notion of an assertion being correct. As such, validity was expected to play a major role in a theory of meaning for a language of anti-realist inspiration, that is, one in which the notion of correctness of an assertion replaces the notion of truth. However, the literature on inferentialism moved away from the debate between realism and antirealism to focus on the more general question of which conditions introduction and elimination rules have to satisfy in order to endow a logical constant with meaning or, with the terminology of Dummett [3] , for the rules to be in 'harmony'. As a result, the definition of validity has lost part of its initial interest, since whereas validity is a global condition on arguments, it looks as if harmony can be at best presented as a local criterion. This has prompted some authors [see for instance 22, 23] to take harmony as the criterion of correctness of rules, quite in the spirit of Definition 3.1 and to simply dismiss the issue of validity of arguments.
In this article I argued that if proof-theoretic semantics is willing to cope with paradoxical phenomena, then Dummett's and Prawitz's definition of the correctness of an inference as validity preservation must indeed be rejected in favour of a local characterization of the correctness of an inference. But at the same time I also showed the significant role that a notion of validity of arguments can play in the development of a semantics on proof-theoretic basis, thereby providing a unifying framework for the two views.
